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15 September 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR:

[REDACTED]  
Chairman, Working Group on Compartmentation  
and Codewords

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FROM: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Bigot Lists

1. Recently in connection with an Inspector General report on a very sensitive HUMINT program which is handled by a bigot list, I received word that cleared personnel were discussing this program with uncleared personnel. When I asked for further details on this, I received the following comments:

"Some project officers noted that they had heard allusions to (this project) from other officers who were uncleared. They also believed that project correspondence is being shown to uncleared persons. They sensed that some project details are being discussed with cleared employees in the presence or earshot of others who are uncleared. This occurs at Headquarters, and is also true in the field where officers work in close quarters with their counterparts. It may result from a tendency to relax security when dealing inside the family. My own judgment, based on a body of evidence developed in other inspections, is that these concerns are valid. More so because clarity and precision have been absent on who is or is not cleared for certain information and when the principle of need to know becomes applicable."


2. I mentioned to you in my previous note that I'm uncertain about the use of bigot lists. The comments above that there is a lack of precision in who's allowed to know and talk about what reveals one of

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the weaknesses of the bigot list system. It may, however, be possible to put the bigots on a more formal and regularized basis and overcome this discrepancy. On the other hand, it may be better to do away with bigots entirely. I just pass this along as something that came to my eye.

  
STANSFIELD TURNER

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